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ESTATE TAX EXEMPTION PORTABILITY: WHAT
SHOULD THE IRS DO? AND WHAT SHOULD
PLANNERS DO IN THE INTERIM?
Mitchell M. Gans, Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Austin Bramwell*
Editors' Synopsis: This Article addresses the problem of the lack of
portability of the estate tax exemption: if one spouse dies without using
the exemption, it is lost, and the surviving spouse cannot retain it for
later use. The authors trace the InternalRevenue Service's response to
this problem throughfour private letter rulings and conclude that the
analysis used in the rulings is problematic because it could undermine
enforcement of the InternalRevenue Code in other contexts. Instead, the
authors propose a new approach to resolving the portability problem
and recommend that it be implemented administratively so that tax
payers may employ it safely.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The estate tax exemption is not portable. As a result, if one spouse
dies without having used the exemption, it disappears, and the surviving
spouse cannot use the deceased spouse's exemption. While portability
legislation has been proposed, Congress has failed to act thus far. Without
portability legislation, estate planning has been difficult for a significant
number of married couples who have what some may describe as
intermediate-level wealth.

In a series of four private letter rulings,1 the Internal Revenue Service
(Service) has responded sympathetically, creating in effect an administrative solution to the portability problem.2 The difficulty, however, is that
taxpayers are unable to rely on such rulings. In the absence of published
guidance, the Service may decide to change its position and then apply a
new standard to taxpayers who have utilized the previously approved
drafting blueprint without having secured their own ruling.3 This
I See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200604028 (Sept. 30, 2005); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200403094 (Sept.
24, 2003); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200210051 (Dec. 10, 2001); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200101021 (Oct. 2,
2000 'For a discussion of the portability problem
and the strategy approved in the rulings,
see John F. Bergner, Waste Not Want Not-Creative Use of General Powers of
Appointment to Fund Tax-Advantaged Trusts, 41 U. MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN. P 1400
(2007); Len Cason, IRS Ruling Approves 'PoorerSpouse Funding Technique,' 31 EST.
PLAN. 234 (2004); Len Cason, Maximizing Funding of Credit Shelter Trust with Non-IRA
Assets, 29 EST. PLAN. 282 (2002); Reed W. Easton, How to Fully Fund a Credit-Shelter
Trust Without TransferringAssets or Using Retirement Plans, 105 J. TAX. 349 (2006);
Mitchell M. Gans & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Making Spousal Estate Tax Exemptions
Transferable, 19 PROB. & PROP., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 10; John H. Martin, The Joint Trust:
Estate Planning in a New Environment, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 275 (2004);
Michael D. Mulligan, Is It Safe to Use a Power ofAppointment in PredeceasingSpouse to
Avoid Wasting Applicable Exclusion Amount?, 32 TAx MGMT. EST., GIFTS & TR. J. 191
(2007).
3 See Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331 (2003), aff'd, 417 F.3d
468 (5th Cir. 2005); Cook v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 15 (2000), aff'd, 269 F.3d 854 (7th Cir.
2001). In these cases, the Service disavowed the taxpayer-friendly positions it had taken in
private letter rulings and did not provide grandfather protection for these taxpayers who
may have modeled their planning on the basis of the analysis contained in the rulings.
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uncertainty is particularly problematic because, as will be explained, the
Service's analysis in these rulings may be incorrect. 4 Indeed, incorporating the analysis in published guidance could undermine the Service's
enforcement of the Code in unrelated contexts.
In this Article, we suggest a new approach. Under this approach,
taxpayers would be able to navigate the portability problem, and the
Service would not weaken unrelated Code provisions. In Parts II and III,
we explain the portability problem and the Service's solution to it. In Part
IV, we explore the Service's private letter rulings and critique the Service's analysis. In Part V, we present an alternative solution for the portability problem. We suggest that the Service implement our proposed
solution administratively and allow taxpayers to employ it safely in the

Under section 6110(k)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), a private letter ruling may
not be cited or used as precedent. See I.R.C. § 611 0(k)(3). On the other hand, if the
Service issues published guidance, it may not change its position retroactively. See
generally JONATHAN G. BLATTMACHR, MITCHELL M. GANS & DAMIEN Rios, THE
CIRCULAR 230 DESKBOOK ch. I (PLI 2006). Unless the Code is unambiguously contrary
to the ruling, the modem trend is to hold the Service bound by a taxpayer-friendly position
taken in a ruling as long as the ruling has not been revoked at the time of the Service's
challenge (even where the Service has revoked the ruling before asserting its new position
in court but after the taxpayer has consummated the transaction, the trend is to hold the
Service bound by its rulings). See Estate of McLendon v. Comm'r, 135 F.3d 1017 (5th
Cir. 1998). But dicta in a Claims Court decision suggests that the Service may disavow
retroactively taxpayer-friendly revenue rulings. See Mulligan, supra note 2, at 201 (citing
Vons Cos. Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1, 6 (2001)).
In Vons, the Claims Court suggests that the court in McLendon failed to apply the
Supreme Court's decision in Dixon v. UnitedStates. See Vons, 51 Fed. Cl. at 7 n.4 (citing
Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965)). The Claims Court, however, fails to
recognize four significant points: First, while the Supreme Court did permit the Service to
disavow a taxpayer-friendly ruling in Dixon, the Service had revoked the ruling 10 years
before it took a contrary position in the Supreme Court. See Dixon, 381 U.S. at 71 n.2. In
contrast, in MeLendon, the Service had not revoked the ruling at the time of the litigation.
See McLendon, 135 F.3d at 1022. See also Rauenhorst v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 157 (2002)
(holding the Service bound by a revenue ruling that it had not revoked). Second, the Court
in Dixon left open the possibility that a taxpayer could establish that retroactive revocation
of a ruling is an abuse of discretion. Third, the Service, as McLendon suggests, now
invites greater reliance on its rulings than it did at the time Dixon was decided. Finally, a
distinction must be made-which the Vons court fails to make-between rulings that seek
to resolve ambiguity in the Code and rulings that take a position contrary to an
unambiguous Code provision. The Service may not undermine an unambiguous Code
provision with rulings. See Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336 n.8 (1995). Yet,
nothing precludes the Service from definitively resolving the meaning of an ambiguous
provision in favor of taxpayers.
4 The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel has requested the Service to
issue a published ruling, but the Service has not responded.
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interim. Finally, we present our concluding comments.

II. THE PORTABILITY PROBLEM
Each taxpayer enjoys a "unified credit" against the estate tax. 5 The
credit operates, in effect, as an exemption. If one taxpayer does not use
the credit, it cannot be transferred to another taxpayer. Thus, if a husband
has no assets and predeceases his wife, his unified credit is wasted in the
sense that his wife cannot later apply any of his unused credit (exemption)
against estate taxes due at her death.6
This waste of the credit may occur not only where, as suggested, a
spouse dies without assets but also where a spouse bequeaths more than
the optimal amount to the surviving spouse, overutilizing the marital
deduction. For example, if a husband dies and bequeaths his entire estate
to his wife outright, his exemption is wasted.' At the wife's subsequent
death, her estate, which includes the assets received from her husband's
estate, is fully taxable to the extent it exceeds her own exemption. Had the
husband instead left his exemption amount in a credit shelter trust 8 for the
benefit of his wife, his exemption would have been preserved; no tax
would have been incurred at his death, and the assets in the trust would
not be subject to tax at her later death.9
5 See I.R.C.

§

2010.

6 Note, however, that if the husband had made taxable gifts during his lifetime after

1976, they would constitute adjusted taxable gifts. See I.R.C. § 2001(b). As such, the gifts
would in effect absorb at least part of the exemption and thereby prevent the exemption
from being entirely wasted.
7Overutilization of the marital deduction can also occur even where the
bequest for
the benefit of the surviving spouse is not on an outright basis. For example, if the husband
placed all of his assets in a trust with an income interest and a general power of
appointment to his wife, the entire amount bequeathed in trust qualifies for the marital
deduction. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5). At the wife's later death, her gross estate includes the
entire corpus. See I.R.C. § 2041. Thus, although the bequest is not on an outright basis,
the same potential for waste of the husband's exemption can occur.
8 A "credit shelter trust" is a trust drafted to avoid inclusion in the surviving spouse's
gross estate. The terms of the trust are designed to prevent Code sections 2033 or 2041
from applying in the surviving spouse's estate. When a spouse dies and bequeaths his or
her exemption amount-the amount of assets that can pass free of estate tax by reason of
the unified credit authorized in section 201 0-to such a trust, the exemption is not wasted
in the sense that the assets are not subject to estate tax in either spouse's estate. Although
not necessary in order to protect the exemption, the trust is usually drafted to permit the
surviving spouse access to the trust's assets so that he or she has an opportunity to
continue enjoying them. As indicated, however, the access must be limited in order to
prevent the application of Code sections 2033 or 2041 at the surviving spouse's death.
9 Where a pension is involved, a spouse may choose to overutilize the marital

FALL 2007

Estate Tax Exemption Portability 417

The Code's failure to make the exemption "portable," resulting in the
wife's inability to use her husband's unused exemption in this example,
cannot be justified as a matter of tax policy. To illustrate, assume that the
husband of one couple has no assets and his wife has $8 million in assets,
while the husband and wife of a second couple have $4 million in assets
each. If both husbands die in 2007 survived by their wives, only the
husband of the second couple will be able to use his exemption by placing
assets in a credit shelter trust; the other husband's exemption would be
wasted because he has no assets to place in such a trust. Thus, even
though the two couples are situated identically in terms of aggregate
wealth, one couple will be taxed more heavily than the other simply
because of the way in which their assets are titled. The Code, in other
words, inappropriately penalizes taxpayers who title their assets in a
"suboptimal" way.
With proper planning, in many cases, taxpayers can avoid wasting the
exemption. For example, the wealthier spouse can always make a gift to
the poorer spouse of an amount of assets sufficient to use the poorer
spouse's exemption. Ordinarily, such a gift, if made outright, will qualify
for the gift tax marital deduction under section 2523 of the Code.' 0 As a
practical matter, however, the wealthier spouse may be uncomfortable
parting with control of the assets. While this concern can be somewhat
ameliorated through the use of a lifetime qualified terminable interest
property (QTIP) trust" rather than an outright gift, many taxpayers may
still find the loss of control (as well as the loss of income) that a QTIP
trust entails objectionable. In all likelihood, however, concerns such as
loss of control will not deter wealthier taxpayers from creating a QTIP or
even from making an outright gift of an amount sufficient to avoid
wasting the exemption. Concretely, if one spouse has $50 million and the
other spouse has no assets, the wealthier spouse may not experience much

deduction in order to save income tax; if the pension passes to the surviving spouse, rather
than to a credit shelter trust, the income tax imposed on the pension may be deferred for a
longer period of time. See Natalie Choate, Fundinga Credit Shelter Trust with Retirement
Benefits, TR. & EST., Nov. 2001, at 16.
10See I.R.C. § 2523(i). Section 2523 does not allow a gift tax marital deduction for a

transfer made during lifetime to the transferor's spouse where the donee is not a U.S.
citizen. See id. Also, in the case of a gift not made on an outright basis, no marital
deduction applies if the interest given is a nondeductible terminable interest. See
id. § 2523(b).

II See section 2523(0 of the Code for a description of a QTIP trust, which is a trust
that may qualify for the gift tax marital deduction by election. See also section 2056(b)(7)
for a description of such a trust for estate tax purposes.
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discomfort in placing $2 million in a lifetime QTIP trust to make sure that
the other spouse's exemption is not wasted. 12 Thus, in failing to provide
portability, 3 the Code discriminates not only against couples who
title
4
their assets suboptimally but also in favor of wealthier taxpayers.'

III.

THE SERVICE'S PORTABILITY SOLUTION

Mindful of these inequities, Congress has considered legislation that
would make the exemption portable, allowing the surviving spouse to
utilize the predeceased spouse's unused exemption.15 But Congress has
failed to act. As the amount of the exemption has increased (and continues
to increase), the cost to taxpayers of wasting the exemption has increased
concomitantly. 6 In the face of Congress's silence, the Service has
attempted to provide its own solution in a series of recent private letter
rulings. 17 In these rulings, the Service has adopted a taxpayer-friendly
stance with regard to a strategy designed to prevent the poorer spouse
from dying without having used his or her exemption. 18
12

Indeed, because the spouse who creates a QTIP trust can, at the time of the trust's

creation, select the beneficiary who takes the remainder interest at the donee spouse's
death, a wealthy spouse may find such a trust to be a very attractive opportunity. The trust
allows the donor spouse, in effect, to pass wealth to his or her chosen beneficiaries free of
estate tax by utilizing the donee spouse's exemption. The trust can also reduce estate tax
to the extent that the donee spouse's marginal estate tax bracket is less than that of the
donor spouse.
13 See generally Gans & Blattmachr, supra note 2 (discussing
issues resulting from
lack of portability and complications from attempting to balance spousal assets to reduce
estate taxes).
14 A spouse who is not concerned about the surrender of control can also utilize
the
other spouse's exemption by making an inter vivos gift to a third party and by having the
non-transferor spouse consent to split the gift. See I.R.C. § 2513 (permitting the
application of the donor and non-donor spouse's exemption against the gift).
15 See Permanent Estate Tax Relief Act of 2006, H.R. 5638, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006).
16 See I.R.C. § 2010; Gans & Blattmachr, supra note 2, at 11.
17 See supra
note 1.
18 The Service, after discussing the portability issue, also addresses the basis
question
of whether section 10 14(e) of the Code applies to deny a basis adjustment on the death of
the donee spouse. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200210051 (Dec. 10, 2001); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200101021 (Oct. 2, 2000). Although section 1014 is beyond the scope of this Article, the
provision applies to deny a basis adjustment where the property passes back to the donor.
While property did pass back to the donor (either outright or via a general power marital
trust) in these two rulings, the question remains whether the same result would be
appropriate where property passes into a discretionary credit shelter trust for the benefit of
the donor (or perhaps even a QTIP trust or credit shelter trust mandating income
distributions to the donor). See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9321050 (Feb. 25, 1993) (denying a basis
adjustment only with respect to the mandatory income interest in the trust for the benefit
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A. The Basic GPOA Strategy
Under the General Power of Appointment (GPOA) strategy, the donor
spouse creates a revocable trust that confers upon the donee spouse a
general testamentary power of appointment. Because the trust is
revocable, the donor does not have to surrender control of assets in order
to implement the GPOA strategy. The trust provides that, at the death of
the donee spouse, the donor's revocation power is extinguished. Thus, if
the donor does not revoke the trust before the donee's death, the assets
subject to the power pass at the donee's death into a trust for the benefit
of the donor spouse. The recipient trust is designed so that the donor is a
beneficiary of the trust without causing the trust assets to be included in
the donor's gross estate. The trust can be funded either through the lapse
of the donee's general power of appointment or through the donee's
exercise of the power of appointment (in favor of such a trust created

of the spouse). Cf Tech. Adv. Mem. 9308002 (Nov. 16, 1992) (applying Code section
1014(e) where the property passed outright back to the donor spouse). As suggested in the
technical advice memorandum (TAM), the Service presumably will argue that, section
1014(e) aside, no basis adjustment should occur when the GPOA strategy applies, even
though property passes back to the donor via a discretionary trust, on the rationale that the
property is not acquired from the decedent within the meaning of section 1014(b)(9). In
other words, as the TAM appears to suggest, property passes into the trust at the donee's
death by reason of the donor's decision not to revoke-not by reason of the donee's
decision to exercise the power or to allow it to lapse.
If, however, a revocable QTIP strategy is used instead (for a discussion of this
strategy, see infra Part V.A.), the basis adjustment would occur by reason of section
1014(b)(10), and the Service's section 1014(b)(9) argument would appear to become
irrelevant. Nevertheless, the Service conceivably might argue that the property in the
QTIP trust should be treated for income tax purposes as if entirely owned at all times by
the donor spouse on account of its grantor-trust status. If the beneficiary/spouse is eligible
to receive principal distributions as well as the trust's income, the donor spouse should be
treated as the owner under section 677. See Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184. See also
Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Mitchell N. Gans & Hugh H. Jacobson, Income Tax Effects of
Termination of GrantorTrust Status by Reason of the Grantor'sDeath, 97 J. TAX'N 149
(2002) (suggesting that Code section 1014 apply on the assumption that the grantor of a
wholly owned grantor trust had owned the trust's assets). However, such an argument
would appear to be inconsistent with the clear and specific language in section
1014(b)(10) to the effect that basis is to be adjusted at the death of the spouse/beneficiary
in the case of all QTIP trusts. For a further discussion of the basis issue, see Bergner,
supra note 2; Charles Davenport, Tax Basis Revocable Trusts: Many Questions, Few
Answers, 77 TAx NOTES 1175 (Dec. 8, 1997) (Letter to the Editor); Paul M. Fletcher, Tax
Basis Revocable Trusts, 63 TAx NOTES 1183 (May 30, 1994); Malcolm A. Moore, Estate
Planningfor the Surviving Spouse, ESTATE PLANNING IN DEPTH, SK093 ALI-ABA 1073
(2005); Mulligan, supra note 2. See also Gans & Blattmachr, supra note 2.
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under the donee's will).
To illustrate the usefulness of the GPOA strategy, consider two cases.
In the first case, one spouse is much wealthier than the other but is
unwilling to relinquish control of his or her assets. For example, assume
the wife has $8 million in assets and the husband has no assets. In order to
retain control over her assets while preventing her husband from wasting
his exemption should he predecease her, the wife implements the GPOA
strategy by placing $2 million in a revocable trust under which the
husband has a testamentary general power. If the husband dies during
2007, the $2 million in the trust is included in his gross estate but
generates no estate tax because of his exemption.' 9 At the wife's later
death, her gross estate does not include the assets subject to the husband's
power because the assets remain in trust. Thus, his exemption, which
would have been wasted otherwise, is preserved.
In the second case, the wife is not concerned about retaining control
over her assets. Instead, the couple's difficulty stems from the character of
their assets. For example, assume the wife has $4 million in an Individual
Retirement Account (IRA) 20 and the husband has conventional-non-IRA
and non-pension-assets having an equal value. To reach an optimal
income tax result, the wife should name her husband as the outright
beneficiary of her IRA.2" But if, having done so, she predeceases her
husband, her exemption would be wasted. To prevent this, the husband
could use the GPOA strategy, giving the wife a general power under his
revocable trust. The IRA money would then pass to the husband at her
death, qualifying for the marital deduction, and the assets in his revocable
trust that are subject to her power would be used to absorb her exemption
and fund a credit shelter trust for his benefit after her death. In sum, the
strategy can be very helpful in solving the portability problem if
recognized as valid by the Service.
B. The Service's Analysis of the GPOA Strategy
According to the Service, the GPOA strategy produces the following
consequences: First, because of the donor's revocation power, the donor
does not make a completed taxable gift when the trust is created. Second,
19

See I.R.C. § 2010 (permitting an exemption of $2 million for a decedent dying in
See I.R.C. § 408 (defining an IRA and providing special income tax benefits

applicable to an IRA).
21

See, e.g., Natalie B. Choate, When a "Trust for the Spouse" Is Treated the Same

as "the Spouse," TR. & EST., Sept. 2001, at 36.
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when the donee spouse dies, because the donor's revocation power is
extinguished, the gift-the grant of the general power of
appointment-becomes complete. Third, the gift is not taxable because it
qualifies for the lifetime marital deduction.22 Fourth, because the donor
spouse is deemed to make the gift to the donee spouse, the donor is not
treated as making a taxable gift at the death of the donee to the
beneficiaries under the trust-the trust receiving assets on account of
lapse or exercise of the donee's power. Instead, the donee is viewed as
making the transfer to these beneficiaries. Fifth, because the donee has a
general power of appointment, his or her gross estate includes the assets
subject to the power. 23 Finally, at the donor's later death, the donor's
gross estate does not include the assets in the trust even though the donor
was the sole source of the trust's assets and even though the donor was a
trust beneficiary. Indeed, the Service has even concluded that inclusion is
not required where the donor spouse has a special power of appointment
over the trust's assets. 24 Thus, after the donee spouse's death, the trust
functions as a credit shelter trust, preventing the waste of the donee
spouse's exemption. If the Service's analysis is correct, the donor spouse
is able to retain control over, as well as a beneficial interest in, his or her
assets without wasting the donee spouse's exemption.
The Service's analysis is predicated on the taxpayer-friendly
resolution of two critical issues: First, that the gift made by the donor at
the death of the donee is made to the donee, not his or her estate and not
to the beneficiaries of the credit shelter trust, and that by reason of the
lifetime marital deduction, no taxable gift occurs;25 and, second, that after
the death of the donee the trust will function as a credit shelter trust so
that its assets will not be included in the donor's gross estate under
section 2036 or 2038 (or otherwise) at the donor spouse's later death.
Were the Service to reach a different conclusion on either of these two
issues, the GPOA strategy would be ineffective. Indeed, taxpayers who
employ the GPOA strategy without obtaining a private letter ruling run
the risk that the Service will change its position on either one of these
issues.26
22 As suggested, no marital deduction would be available if the donee spouse were
not a U.S. citizen. See I.R.C. § 2523(i).
23 See I.R.C. § 2041(a).
24 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200101021 (Oct. 2, 2000).

See I.R.C. § 2523.
See I.R.C. § 61 10(k)(3) (stating that the Service is not bound by its reasoning in a
private letter ruling).
25
26
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IV. AN EXAMINATION AND CRITIQUE OF THE SERVICE'S
RULINGS
While the Service's attempt to fashion an administrative solution to
the portability problem is commendable, it would be unfortunate if the
Service inadvertently undermined settled principles that have application
beyond the portability strategy. Perhaps this concern accounts for the
Service's reluctance thus far to address the strategy in published guidance
such as a revenue ruling or regulation.27 On the one hand, the Service's
marital deduction analysis in the private letter rulings is not problematic.
The analysis does not, in other words, pose a threat to settled principles.
On the other hand, the Service's conclusion that the trust corpus is not
taxable on the donor spouse's later death does indeed pose such a threat.
A. Qualification for the Gift Tax Marital Deduction
As suggested, a critical issue in the GPOA strategy relates to the
marital deduction: whether the donor's gift, which occurs when the
donor's revocation power is extinguished at the donee's death,28 qualifies
for the deduction. The Code provides that in order to qualify the gift must
29
be made "to a donee who at the time of the gift is the donor's spouse.
Thus, the availability of the deduction turns on whether the donor and
donee are married at the time the gift becomes complete. If the gift
becomes complete the moment before death, the marital deduction is
unquestionably available. If, on the other hand, the gift becomes complete
the moment after the donee's death, the deduction clearly should not be
permitted because the donor and the donee are no longer married at that
point. But what if the gift is viewed as becoming complete at the very
moment of death rather than the moment before or after death? Taking
this view, one could allow the gift to qualify for the marital deduction
without adversely affecting settled principles. Indeed, two lines of
authority under existing law in analogous contexts treat the transfer as
occurring for transfer tax purposes at the moment before death-even
though the recipient's right does not fully mature until the moment of
death.

27 Unlike a private letter ruling, a revenue ruling is generally reliable guidance to
taxpayers and binds the Service. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c).
29 I.R.C. § 2523(a).
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B. Common Disaster Line of Authority
First, the estate tax marital deduction regulations provide that if
spouses die in a common disaster and no evidence exists as to the order of
their deaths, a bequest made by one spouse to the other will qualify for
the deduction if state law or the will presumes that the legatee spouse has
survived. 30 The regulations further provide, however, that the deduction is
only available to the extent that the Code requires that the bequeathed
amount be included in the legatee spouse's estate. 3' Thus, if both spouses
die at the same moment and the bequest is therefore made at the moment
of death-not the moment before or the moment after death-the
deduction is not denied on the ground that the marriage had already
ended.3"
In Estate of Bagley v. United States, 33 no evidence as to the order of
the death of the spouses existed. The husband's will created a trust for the
benefit of the wife, giving her a general testamentary power of
appointment over the trust. The will also adopted the presumption that, in
the case of a common disaster, the wife would be deemed to survive. The
34
husband's estate took the marital deduction, and the Service allowed it.
The wife's estate argued that the property subject to the power should not
be included in her gross estate. The court rejected this argument.
Concluding that the power was conferred on the wife at the moment of
the husband's death-which, given the lack of evidence as to the order of
deaths, plausibly could have been at the moment of the wife's death-the
court's holding required the wife's estate to include the property subject
to the power under section 2041.35 Although the Service did not challenge
the deduction in the husband's estate, and the court therefore did not
address it, clearly the court and the Service were in tacit agreement that
the taxpayer took the deduction correctly.
Thus, the common disaster regulations, along with the court's
decision in Bagley, suggest that a bequest (or gift) deemed to occur at the
moment of the recipient spouse's death is made while the spouses are still
30 See Treas.
31 See id.
32 See Estate

Reg. § 20.2056(c)-2(e).

of Gordon v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 404 (1978) (applying the simultaneous
death regulation and permitting the marital deduction).
33 443 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1971).
See id. at 1267.
35 See id. at 1269-70. The husband's estate claimed the marital deduction
on the
ground that the trust qualified for the estate tax marital deduction under Code section
2056(b)(5). See id. at 1267.
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married. While the common disaster regulation applies, by its terms, only
to cases where both spouses die at approximately the same time and with
no evidence as to the order of death, no policy justification exists for
refusing to extend this rationale to the GPOA strategy. Indeed, as
suggested, the Service appropriately is seeking to find an administrative
solution to the portability problem. Extending the common disaster
rationale in the fashion suggested in order to accomplish this objective
would pose no threat beyond the strategy.
C. Johnstone Line of Authority
The second line of analogous authority under existing law that
supports the moment-before-death theory stems from the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Johnstone v. Commissioner.36 In Johnstone, the donor created
an inter vivos trust for the benefit of her son, granting him a general
testamentary power of appointment. During her life, she had the right to
alter or amend, but not revoke, the trust. 37 At the moment of the son's
death, the donor's ability to modify or eliminate the son's power was
extinguished. 38 After alluding to the notion that a person holding a power
does not have a general power of appointment because of an outstanding
contingency that is not resolved during his or her lifetime,39 the court held
that the son had a general power of appointment and that the property
subject to the power was therefore included in his gross estate. 40 The
holding in Johnstone, which the Service embraces,4 1 thus suggests that,
where the donor's ability to eliminate the donee's power is extinguished
at the moment of the donee's death, the donor's power creates a
36

76 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1935).

37 See

id. at 56.
See id. at 58.
39 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3.
40 See Johnstone, 76 F.2d at 59. Under the law in effect at the time of the Johnstone
38

decision, the gross estate would include property subject to a general power only if the
person holding the power had exercised it. In Johnstone, the court concluded that the
decedent had in fact exercised the power. See id.
41 Johnstone remains good law. In Estate of Margrave v. Commissioner,
71 T.C. 13
(1978), aff'd 618 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1980), acq. Rev. Rul. 81-166, 1981-1 C.B. 477, the
majority and some of the dissenting judges did disagree on the import of Johnstone. Not
one of the judges, however, questioned the continued viability of Johnstone. Furthermore,
in Revenue Ruling 81-166, 1981-1 C.B. 477, the Service implicitly endorsed the
continuing viability of Johnstone by holding that Margrave represents a narrow lifeinsurance-related exception to the rule that property subject to a general power of
appointment is includible in a decedent's gross estate, even if the property interest is
subject to a power of revocation up to the moment of death.
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contingency 42 that is deemed to be resolved during the donee's
lifetime 43-before
the moment of death." In short, Johnstone
42

It must be conceded that Johnstone could be read differently. Under section

2041(b)(1)(C)(i) of the Code, a person holds a non-general power if it can only be
exercised with the consent of the person creating the power (in the case of a pre-1942
power, as in Johnstone, the power is a non-general power if its exercise requires the
consent of any person). Thus, Johnstone could be read as holding that, at the moment of
death, the decedent had a general power because, at that point, the need for the donor's
consent had been extinguished. As between these two readings, it would seem that
Johnstone is better understood as based on the contingent aspect of the power. To
illustrate, assume that A is given a general power and that the instrument further provides
that B, a trust protector who has no beneficial interest, can eliminate A's power by
amending the instrument. Given B's ability to eliminate the power, it should not be
viewed as a general power as long as B has the power to amend. This is not because B's
consent, or cooperation, is required in order for A to exercise it. For, under section
2041(b)(1)(C)(ii), the requirement that the power holder secure the consent of a person
without any interest in the trust does not render it a non-general power. Rather, it is
because the power is subject to a contingency: that B not amend the trust to eliminate the
power. See United States v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 261 F.2d 570 (5th Cir.
1958) (indicating that a third party's right to eliminate a power renders it a non-general
power on the rationale that, as a result of the third party's right, it is not exercisable by the
person holding the power). Note, parenthetically, the rather subtle difference between this
analysis of a power subject to an amendment power and a case where the power holder
can only exercise it with the consent of a third party having no beneficial interest. In the
latter case, the requirement for third-party consent does not render it a non-general power.
See id. And one cannot take the position that it is a non-general power on the ground that
it is subject to the contingency of securing the third party's consent without rendering this
clear Code provision meaningless. But whether one reads Johnstone as a consent case or
as a contingency case, the result is the same: the decedent held a general power of
appointment because, during his lifetime, the contingency/consent issue had been
resolved. There is one other alternative reading of Johnstone to consider. Under this
reading, even if the donor's modification power had remained intact after the decedent's
death, inclusion still would have been required.
However, no authority would support the application of section 2041 of the Code in
this context. Indeed, in United States v. Turner, 287 F.2d 821, 827 (8th Cir. 1961), the
government's argument was based on the premise that section 2041 cannot apply where
the donor retains a revocation power, and the court agreed with this premise. See also
Merchants Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 261 F.2d at 573-74 (indicating that any outstanding
contingency, like a revocation power, precludes inclusion in the power holder's estate
unless the contingency is resolved at the moment of the power holder's death or earlier).
But see infra note 45 (discussing Revenue Ruling 67-370, 1967-2 C.B. 324, which
addresses an analogous issue in the section 2033 context).
43 Johnstone has been distinguished from later authorities that refuse to apply
section
2041 (as well as section 2033) where the claim or right had not accrued until the moment
after death and was therefore a mere expectancy. See Rev. Rul. 75-126, 1975-1 C.B. 296
(embracing Connecticut Bank and Trust Company v. United States, 465 F.2d 760 (2d Cir.
1972), and therefore concluding that wrongful death proceeds should not be included in
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the decedent's gross estate because the claim does not exist until after the decedent has
died); Rev. Rul. 75-127, 1975-1 C.B. 297 (same); Margrave,618 F.2d at 38-39 (refusing
to apply section 2041 where life insurance on the decedent's life was owned by a third
party and was payable to the decedent's revocable trust on the ground that the decedent's
general power was "merely a power over an expectancy"). See also Estate of Barr v.
Comm'r, 40 T.C. 227 (1963) (holding that a pension benefit was not includible in the
employee's estate because payment was within the discretion of the employer, and it was
therefore a mere expectancy); but see Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b), ex. 4 (indicating that a
retirement payment made to the decedent's spouse is included under section 2039 even
though the employer had no legal obligation to make payment provided that the employer
had a policy of making payment in such circumstances). The distinction, according to the
Tax Court majority in Margrave, is that, in Johnstone, assets, not a mere expectancy, were
in the trust subject to the decedent's power at the time of death; in contrast, in the later
authorities, there was nothing more than an expectancy that did not ripen into an asset or
claim until after death. See Margrave, 71 T.C. at 19. See also Conn. Bank & Tr., 465 F.2d
at 763.
This distinction, however, is somewhat troubling. For while Johnstone did not
involve an expectancy in a technical property-law sense, it could easily be viewed as such
in terms of its substance given the fact that the decedent's power could have been
extinguished until the moment of death. See Margrave, 618 F.2d at 38-39 (indicating,
without discussing Johnstone,that, if the donor retains the right to revoke the power, there
is only an expectancy subject to the power, and section 2041 therefore cannot apply). But
see United States v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 270 F.2d at 573-74 (embracing
Johnstone on the ground that a general power is taxable even though subject to a
contingency as long as it is resolved at or before the power holder's death); Tech. Adv.
Mem. 7744010 (July 29, 1977) (suggesting that the donor's right to revoke a power of
appointment does not defeat the application of section 2041). Indeed, if Johnstone is
correct, it creates the problematic potential for double taxation: the grantor of a trust
similar to the one in Johnstone would be treated as having made a taxable gift at the
moment of the power holder's death. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(f) (resulting in the
simultaneous imposition of the gift tax on the grantor and estate tax in the power holder's
estate). While this was not the result in Johnstone because the gift tax had not yet been
enacted-indeed, had the court ruled differently, the assets in the trust would have passed
in accordance with the decedent's direction without being subject to any transfer tax-the
court's holding does create the potential for this outcome.
Were the Service to disavow Johnstone on the ground that the decedent's power
related to what was in substance a mere expectancy, the potential for double taxation
would be eliminated. See Mitchell M. Gans & Jay A. Soled, A New Modelfor Identifying
Basis in Life Insurance Policies: Implementation and Deference, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 569
(2006) (discussing the government's ability to overrule adverse court decisions by
regulation); BLATrMACHR, GANS & Rios, supra note 3, ch. 1. The grantor would be
treated as making a taxable gift at the time of the power holder's death and the trust's
assets would not be included in the power holder's gross estate. This would appear to be
the correct outcome given the reality, as suggested, that the power holder's interest in the
trust is no more substantive, at the time of death, than the decedent's right to receive the
wrongful death proceeds in the cited revenue rulings or the decedent's right to control the
life insurance proceeds in Margrave. Were the Service to take this approach, it could
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supports the Service's implicit conclusion in the private letter rulings that
the donor spouse's revocation power is deemed to be extinguished the
moment before the donee spouse's death-while they are still married. 45
nonetheless confirm the availability of the marital deduction in the context of the GPOA
strategy. After all, it would be consistent with the policies underlying the marital
deduction to do so, as the common-disaster authorities reflect.
44A distinction appears between Johnstone and the GPOA strategy
approved in the
private letter rulings. While in Johnstone the donor could have eliminated the son's power
of appointment, she could not revoke the trust. In contrast, in the private letter rulings the
donor spouse had the right to revoke the trust in its entirety. The difference is not a
significant one. Indeed, if the Service or the courts were to deem the difference
significant, the GPOA strategy could be salvaged nonetheless by making the donor's
retained power parallel to the donor's power in Johnstone. Like a revocation power, the
power to modify would render the donor spouse's gift incomplete until the donee spouse
dies. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c).
45But cf Rev Rul. 73-207, 1973-1 C.B. 409 (indicating that, for
gift tax purposes, a
gift that occurs at the moment of the husband's death cannot be split with the wife because
they are no longer married at that moment).
Had the donor's modification power in Johnstone remained intact after the son's
death, the property subject to the power presumably would not have been included in the
son's gross estate. For, as suggested, a power subject to a contingency that remains
unresolved at the time of the power holder's death should not be subject to section 2041
(or the predecessor provision at issue in Johnstone). See Margrave, 618 F.2d at 38-39;
Turner, 287 F.2d at 827; Merchants Nat 'l Bank of Mobile, 261 F.2d at 573. Indeed, as the
Eighth Circuit in Margrave suggests, even if the donor's right to revoke the power is
extinguished at the moment of death, the power should not trigger section 2041 on the
rationale that the power relates to a mere expectancy. Thus, where a donor confers a
power of appointment on a donee, inclusion in the donee's estate under section 2041
should only occur if donor's gift becomes complete prior to the moment of the donee's
death (and, perhaps, as the Eighth Circuit in Margrave suggests, inclusion may not be
appropriate even where the donor's revocation power is extinguished at the moment of the
donee's death).
This is to be contrasted with the treatment of a contingent interest under section
2033. In Revenue Ruling 67-370, 1967-2 C.B. 324, the donor created a revocable trust.
The remainderman under the trust died while the donor was still alive. Even though the
donor's revocation power remained intact after the remainderman's death, the Service
concluded that the remainderman's interest was taxable under section 2033-with the
Service acknowledging that the contingency would bear on the valuation analysis. Thus,
unlike section 2041, section 2033 does not contain a contingency exception and
apparently, therefore, contemplates the possibility that the donee could be required to
include the interest in his or her gross estate even though the donor's gift is not yet
complete at the time of the donee's death (for example, because the donor's revocation
power remains intact, the gift is incomplete under Treasury Regulation § 25.2511-2(b)).
Parenthetically, Revenue Ruling 67-370, reaches a troubling conclusion: whereas a
beneficiary under a will who predeceases the testator has at the time of death a mere
expectancy and is therefore not required to include it in the gross estate, as discussed
above, the ruling concludes that a beneficiary in a similar position under a revocable trust
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D. Terminable Interest Rule Issue
Even assuming the gift to the donee spouse is deemed to occur the
moment before death, the marital deduction still may be denied if the gift
is found to constitute a nondeductible terminable interest. 46 In approving
the GPOA strategy in the private letter rulings and concluding that the
marital deduction is available, the Service does not address this issue, thus

is subject to a contrary rule. There is no policy rationale for this distinction. In substance,
because it can be revoked at any time, the interest under a revocable trust is just as much
an expectancy as the interest under the will of a living testator and should be treated as
such. For a parallel argument suggesting that Johnstone should be overruled, see supra
note 43. Indeed, as suggested in the note discussing Johnstone, imposing the estate tax on
such an expectancy creates the problematic potential for double taxation occurring
simultaneously: the grantor of the trust is subject to gift tax, and the decedent is subject to
estate tax. Moreover, as a practical matter, including such a remainder interest in the
beneficiary's estate is of little consequence in that, despite the contrary contention in the
ruling, the grantor's continuing revocation power gives it a nominal, if not zero, value: as
a matter of traditional valuation, see Treasury Regulation § 20.2031.-i(b), a hypothetical
purchaser of an such an interest would take into account the existence of the revocation
power under state law and would therefore be unwilling to pay more than a nominal sum
as a purchase price. See Adams v. United States, 218 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2000) (taking into
account uncertainty under state law in applying the hypothetical-purchaser rule). See also
Rev. Rul. 75-71, 1975-1 C.B. 309 (acknowledging the difficulty of valuing the right to
receive a bequest under the will of a living testator). In short, given this practical
consequence and the potential for double taxation, it makes little sense to treat what is in
substance an expectancy as if it were something more substantive. (Should the Service
consider revoking the ruling, it might also reconsider Revenue Ruling 75-71, where it
imposed gift tax on the assignment of an expectancy by determining that the gift was not
complete until the expectancy had ripened into a claim capable of valuation. The ruling
not only creates an unjustified distinction between the estate tax and gift tax treatment of
the transfer of an expectancy, but also relies on the now-discredited theory that a gift
remains incomplete where value cannot be readily determined. See Estate of DiMarco v.
Comm'r, 87 T.C. 653, n.8 (1986). For a discussion of this theory, see Mitchell M. Gans,
Gift Tax: Valuation Difficulties and Gift Completion, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 493
(1983).)
Finally, Revenue Ruling 67-370 is perhaps an anachronism, issued at a time when the
distinction between a revocable trust and a will was more substantial. In more recent
years, this distinction has been disappearing because of efforts, at both the federal and
state level, to treat these two forms of transfer in the same fashion based on the
recognition that in substance they are equivalents. See Alan Newman, The Intention of the
Settlor Under the Uniform Trust Code: Whose PropertyIs It, Anyway? 38 AKRON L. REv.
649 (2005) (discussing section 603 of the Uniform Trust Code, under which the trustee
owes no duties to the beneficiary of a revocable trust during the settlor's life-thus
mirroring the rule that, in the case of a will, the beneficiary has no claim for actions taken
durinthe testator's life). See also I.R.C. § 645.
See I.R.C. § 2523(b).
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implying that the gift to the donee spouse is not a nondeductible
terminable interest. The risk remains, however, that the Service might
reexamine the position it takes in the rulings and reach a different
conclusion on this issue.4 7
In the rulings, the donee spouse is given a stand-alone or "naked"
testamentary general power of appointment-stand-alone in the sense the
donee gets the power without an income interest. Unlike a general power
that is exercisable during the life of the donee, such a testamentary standalone power does not satisfy the general power exception. to the
terminable interest rule.48 Thus, in order to qualify for the marital
deduction, the gift must satisfy the contours of a case law exception. 9
Under this exception, if the donee spouse is given an election to either
accept or reject a gift within a reasonable period of time and in fact
accepts it, the deduction is available. But if, as in some of the rulings,
the donee allows the power to lapse,51 this cannot be viewed as an
acceptance of the gift, and the case law exception to the terminable
interest rule would appear unavailable. Even if, as in the remaining
rulings,5 2 the donee exercises the power in favor of his or her estate, the
question remains whether the exception applies; for the exception has
only been applied thus far in cases where the donee personally accepts the
gift. In sum, although the Service takes a taxpayer-friendly approach on
the terminable interest question in the rulings in its attempt to find a
solution to the portability problem, questions will remain about this issue
until the Service issues published guidance. 3

47

For a further discussion of the terminable interest problem, see Gans &

Blattmachr, supra note 2.
48 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(e)- (f)(6) (indicating that giving the donee an income
interest is not necessary if the donee has a general power exercisable during life).
49 See Rev. Rul. 82-184, 1982-2 C.B. 215 (embracing the cases that create
the
exception).
See id.
51 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200210051 (Dec. 10, 2001); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200101021 (Oct. 2,
2000k See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200604028 (Sept. 30, 2005); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200403094 (Sept.
24, 2003).
In the meantime, practitioners may consider making the donee spouse's estate the
default taker under the power of appointment. Under this approach, the terminable interest
rule should not apply on the ground that, upon the lapse of the power, the interest does not
pass to a third party but instead passes to the donee spouse's estate. See Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2523(b)-1(B)(1)(i).
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E. The GPOA Strategy and the Step Transaction Doctrine
In order for the GPOA strategy to be effective, the assets in the trust
must not be included in the donor spouse's gross estate at his or her later
death. If the gross estate includes the trust assets, the donee spouse's
exemption is in effect wasted, and the strategy fails. In the private letter
rulings approving the strategy, the Service concludes without substantive
analysis that the surviving spouse's gross estate does not include the
trust's assets under section 2036 or 2038 on the theory that the donee,
rather than the donor, had transferred them to the trust. This aspect of the
rulings is the weakest link in the Service's conclusions with respect to the
strategy.54 While the Service understandably seeks to adopt a reading of
the Code to assist taxpayers encountering portability difficulties, it should
not gratuitously adopt a position that other taxpayers can use to create
unintended consequences." Incorporating the conclusions reached in the
rulings in published guidance might weaken sections 2036 and 2038
significantly as applied in other contexts. After explaining how such
guidance could undermine these sections, we discuss an alternative
solution for dealing with portability-a solution that planners may
currently use without downside risk and that the Service can authorize
administratively without concern about a negative impact in other
contexts.
The weakness in the rulings is their failure to consider the step
transaction doctrine. 6 In concluding that the donor (surviving) spouse's
estate does not include the assets in the trust under section 2036 or 2038,
the private letter rulings ignore the doctrine. Under the doctrine, the donor
spouse easily would be viewed as the transferor of the property held in the
trust. After all, the donor spouse transfers the assets to the trust and can
revoke the trust at any time until the moment of the donee spouse's death.
When the donee spouse exercises the power or instead allows it to lapse at

54 But see Mulligan, supra note 2, at 195-97 (suggesting that the weakest aspect of
the rulings is the conclusion that the donor's gift to the donee at the time of the donee's
death Qualifies for the lifetime marital deduction).
If the Service adopts a taxpayer-friendly principle in a revenue ruling, taxpayers
may be able to utilize that principle in other contexts. See Dover Corp. & Subsidiaries v.
Comm'r, 122 T.C. 324 (2004) (holding the Service bound by a taxpayer-friendly principle
even though the Service had announced the principle in a different context).
56 See generally Jay A. Soled,

Use of JudicialDoctrines in Resolving Transfer Tax

Controversies, 42 B.C. L. REv. 587 (2001) (describing courts' application of the step
transaction doctrine to resolve controversies involving transfer taxes).

FALL 2007

Estate Tax Exemption Portability 431

the time of death, the assets remain in trust only because the donor spouse
chooses not to exercise the revocation power.
Consider this similar arrangement: A donor spouse gives property to
the donee spouse on the understanding that the donee will convey the
property to a trust for the benefit of the donor. If the donee, in accordance
with the understanding, immediately conveys the property to the trust, the
donor would almost certainly be treated as the grantor of this trust under
the step transaction doctrine.57 And if the donor had an income interest
under the trust, the donor's estate unquestionably would include the trust
assets under section 2036(a)(1). 58
Likewise, in the case of the GPOA strategy, the donor spouse should
be treated as the transferor of the trust property. The donor spouse decides
not to revoke the trust only if he or she is satisfied with the terms of the
donee's instrument exercising the power or the donee's spouse's decision
to allow the power to lapse. Put differently, because of the donor's
revocation power, the donee cannot, as a practical matter, make a
disposition of the trust's assets that is objectionable to the donor. 9 Indeed,
absent the Service's concern about portability, the Service might not have
decided so facilely that the donor spouse should not be viewed as the
transferor.6 ° In short, if the step transaction doctrine is not ignored and if
the donor is, say, the income beneficiary of the trust-or has some other
interest or power with respect to the trust that falls within the scope of
section 2036 or 2038-the donor spouse's estate should include the trust's
assets.61
57 See Estate of Skifter v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 1190, 1200 n.5 (1972), aft'd,
468 F.2d
699 (2d Cir. 1972); Estate of Sinclaire v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 742 (1949) (applying the step
transaction doctrine in these circumstances and thereby invoking section 2036 of the
Code). See also Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) ("An interest or right is treated as having been
retained or reserved if at the time of the transfer there was an understanding, express, or
implied, that the interest or right would later be conferred.").
58 See Sinclaire, 13 T.C. at 746.
59 Cf Tech. Adv. Mem. 9308002 (Feb. 26, 1993) (indicating that property
was not
acquired from the decedent for purposes of section 1014 where the donor spouse could
have revoked the trust until the death of the donee spouse). But cf Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9321050
(Feb. 25, 1993) (determining that, where the donor spouse did not retain a revocation
power, section 2036 was inapplicable in the donor spouse's estate at her later death even
though the donee spouse had allowed the power to lapse, and as a result, the donor spouse
was entitled to the trust's income during her life).
60 See Mulligan, supra note 2, at 195-96 (suggesting that the Service could invoke
the step transaction doctrine in the context of the GPOA strategy).
Sections 2036 and 2038 of the Code are applicable only if, in addition to making a
transfer, the decedent held certain rights or powers with respect to the trust. See
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Thus, incorporating the Service's conclusions in the rulings in
published guidance would weaken sections 2036 and 2038
unintentionally to the extent that the guidance could be read as
disavowing the applicability of the step transaction doctrine in this
context. Perhaps, however, the guidance might seek to make this
distinction between the hypothesized arrangement and the GPOA
strategy: in the former case, the donee makes an inter vivos transfer to the
trust, whereas in the latter case the transfer to the trust occurs by reason of
the donee's death. The guidance, in other words, could concede that the
doctrine does not apply where the donee's transfer occurs at the donee's
death on the ground that death is such a unique event that it should not be
integrated with the donor's transfer. At the same time, the guidance could
maintain that the doctrine would continue to apply where the donee's
transfer to the trust has no relation to the donee's death.
However drafted-whether disavowing the doctrine entirely or only
where the donee's transfer was death-related-the guidance would
represent a break with current law and thereby would weaken sections
2036 and 2038 in contexts unrelated to the portability problem. Until
now, the step transaction doctrine has been assumed to apply where the
donor's transfer and the donee's transfer were part of a prearranged plan,
even if the donee's transfer occurred at the time of death.
In Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner,6 2 the Tax Court refused to
invoke the doctrine where the decedent had made a transfer of ownership
of a life insurance policy on his life to his wife and she then bequeathed it
back to him in trust, naming him as trustee.63 In rejecting the Service's
section 2042 argument that the decedent-insured held an "incident of
ownership," the court reasoned that inclusion would not have been
appropriate under section 2036 or 2038 if a non-insurance asset were
instead held in the trust. Seeking to maintain the parallel approach for
insurance and non-insurance assets that Congress apparently intended, the
court held that the proceeds were not includible under section 2 0 4 2 .' The
court, however, strongly suggested that, if the facts showed that the
transfer to the donee and the donee's bequest had been part of a
prearranged plan, inclusion of the proceeds in the donor's gross estate

I.R.C §§ 2036, 2038.
6 56 T.C. 1190 (1972), aff'd 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972).
63 See id. at 1200 n.5.
64 See id. at 1198-99.
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would have been appropriate. 65 In Revenue Ruling 84-179, the Service
similarly suggests that on facts similar to Skifiter, it would apply the
doctrine if the donor's transfer and the donee's bequest had been
prearranged.66 Thus, any published guidance addressing portability that
disclaimed the applicability of the step transaction doctrine merely
because the donee's transfer occurred at the time of death would appear to
narrow the scope of sections 2036 and 2038 in non-portability contexts as
well.

67

This is not to suggest, however, that the Service necessarily should
have applied section 2036 or 2038 in the surviving spouse's estate in the
GPOA rulings. Rather, had it properly applied the step transaction
doctrine and found that the surviving spouse had made a transfer, the
Service would have had to make an additional determination: whether the
surviving spouse had an interest or right with respect to the trust sufficient
to invoke one of these sections. 68 If, for example, the surviving spouse

had the right to receive the income from the trust during life, section
2036(a)(1) would bring the trust's assets into the surviving spouse's gross
estate. Similarly, if the terms of the trust gave the surviving spouse a
special (non-general) power of appointment-an approach that, as a
practical matter, a prudent practitioner might well recommend when

See id. at 1200 n.5. The Second Circuit, in affirming the Tax Court decision,
emphasized the fact that the bequest back to the decedent was made "long after he had
65

divested himself of all interest in the policies." Estate of Skifter v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 699,
703 (2d Cir. 1972). Also, the Tax Court intimated that inclusion would have been
appropriate had the two transfers been part of a prearranged plan. See Skifter, 56 T.C. at

1200 n.5.
66 See Rev. Rul. 84-179, 1984-2 C.B. 195 (emphasizing that the decedent's transfer
to the donee and the bequest back to the decedent in trust were unrelated and not part of a
prearranged plan).
67 In explaining its position in Revenue Ruling 84-179, the Service makes clear
that
it would invoke the step transaction doctrine if the decedent's transfer and the donee's
bequest for the benefit of the decedent were part of a prearranged plan. See Gen. Couns.
Mem. 38,751 (June 12, 1981). Indeed, the memorandum explicitly indicates that cases
where the donee's transfer occurs shortly after the decedent's transfer would invoke the
doctrine. See id.
68 Sections 2036 and 2038 require not only that the decedent make a transfer but
also
that the decedent retain (in the case of section 2036) or have at the time of death (in the
case of section 2038) continuing control or access with regard to the trust. The nature of
the control or access that triggers inclusion is different depending on which of the two
sections is at issue. See generally CHARLES L.B. LOWNDES, ROBERT KRAMER & JOHN H.
MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES chs. 8 & 9 (3d ed. 1974).
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utilizing the GPOA strategy69-section 2038 would require inclusion at
the surviving spouse's death.7"
F.

Implied Understanding and Creditors' Rights

What if the surviving spouse had neither an income interest nor a
power of appointment but were merely a discretionary beneficiary of the
trust? Would section 2036 apply in these circumstances? The Service
would be able to invoke the section on one of two grounds: (1) if the
donor spouse had an implied understanding that he or she would receive
distributions from the trust;7 or (2) if the donor spouse's creditors had the
ability, under state law, to reach the trust's assets.
1. Implied Understanding

In terms of an implied understanding, although the lower court
decisions may be in some tension with the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Byrum,72 courts uniformly apply the section where such
an implied understanding about trust distributions exists.73 Similarly, in
69

Cautious practitioners who rely on the private letter rulings may be concerned

about the possibility that the Service might decide to change its position and argue that the
donor spouse makes a taxable gift at the death of the donee to the beneficiaries of the
trust. Even if the donor is a beneficiary of the trust, under this theory, the entire amount
conveyed to the trust could be taxable under section 2702. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702l(c)(l) (indicating that, unless the gift is wholly incomplete, section 2702 applies, making
the entire amount contributed to the trust a taxable gift unless the donor retains a
"qualified interest"). To prevent against the risk of being taxable, cautious practitioners
will give the donor spouse a special power of appointment. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c)
(rendering the gift wholly incomplete and thereby defeating the application of section
2702 where the donor retains a power of appointment). For a discussion of the use of such
a power in order to eliminate this risk, see Gans & Blattmachr, supra note 2. But, as
suggested in the text, this precaution could cause the strategy to fail should the Service
reach the correct conclusion about the step transaction doctrine and thereby invoke section
2038. Nonetheless, given the downside risk of a taxable gift at the death of the donee
spouse, the suggested precaution is worth adopting even if it may result in the failure to
achieve the upside goal of preserving the donee spouse's exemption.
70 Unlike section 2036 of the Code, section 2038 does not have a retention element.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-348, 1970-2 C.B. 193. Thus, section 2038 can apply even if the
decedent did not retain the power at the time of transfer but acquired it before death.
Nonetheless, this principle is not without limitation: the section does not apply if the
decedent acquires the power in a transfer that is not related to the decedent's initial
transfer. See Rev. Rul. 84-179, 1984-2 C.B. 195 (embracing this aspect of Skifter).
71See Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7 (illustrating this principle).
72 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
73See, e.g, Estate of Paxton v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 785 (1986). In Byrum, the
Supreme
Court held that the decedent could not retain possession or enjoyment (within the meaning
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terms of a creditors' rights theory, little question remains about the
appropriateness of invoking section 2036 on this ground.74
2.

Creditors' Rights

Thus, even without an implied understanding about distributions, the
section nonetheless applies if under state law the donor spouse's creditors
could reach the trust's assets. In most states,75 where the grantor of a trust
is a permissible beneficiary, his or her creditors can reach the grantor's
assets to the extent that the trustee could, under a maximum exercise of
discretion, make distributions to the grantor.7 6 Assuming that state law
views the donor spouse as the grantor of the trust-which should be the
case whenever the GPOA strategy applies given the fact that the donor
spouse funds the revocable trust that converts into the credit shelter trust
for the benefit of the donor spouse after the donee spouse's death-the

of section 2036) where the cooperation of a third party is necessary and the third party
owes a fiduciary duty to someone else. See Byrum, 408 U.S. at 143. In Paxton, in contrast,
without acknowledging this aspect of Byrum, the court concluded that the decedent had
retained possession or enjoyment even though the trustee owed a fiduciary duty to
beneficiaries other than the decedent. See Paxton, 86 T.C. at 806, 808. Like the court in
Paxton, the Service in Revenue Ruling 2004-64 also failed to consider the trustee's
fiduciary duty to others. See Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7. On the other hand, in
Bongard, the court intimates that a fiduciary duty owed to someone other than the
decedent might preclude a finding of retained possession or enjoyment, but ultimately
ruled against the estate on the ground that the general partner's fiduciary duty should be
disregarded because the partnership did not carry on an active business. See Estate of
Bongprd v. Comm'r, 124 T.C. 95, 154, 163 (2005).
Under the creditors' rights theory, the grantor's gross estate includes the trust
under section 2036(a)(1) if the creditors of the grantor may attach the assets in the trust.
See, e.g., Herzog v. Comm'r, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941); Paxton, 86 T.C. at 785; Estate
of German v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 641 (1985); Outwin v. Comm'r, 76 T.C. 153 (1969);
Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7; Rev. Rul. 77-378, 1977-2 C.B. 347.
75 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-2-1-18 (LexisNexis 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 33101 (2000); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.1 (McKinney 2002); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1335.01(A) (LexisNexis 2006).
76 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS

§ 60 cmt. f. But see In re Schultz, 324 B.R.
712, 720 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005) (indicating that, given the authorities that are contrary
to the Restatement's approach, the court was not required to consider the standard
contained in the instrument in determining the amount creditors could reach); Robert T.
Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors' Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 294
(2002) (suggesting that, in the case of a trust providing for the support of the settlor,
courts might permit creditors to reach the trust's assets even if they did not provide the
settlor with support-related items, but criticizing the self-settled trust doctrine in general
on the ground that creditors should not be able to defeat the rights of other beneficiaries).
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donor's creditors should be able to reach his or her assets.7 7 Simply put, if
creditors have this right under state law, the donor spouse's gross estate
should include the trust's assets. Importantly, however, this would be the
case only if the step transaction doctrine applies. Otherwise, section 2036
should not apply. The ability of the donor spouse's creditors to reach the
trust's assets does not, in and of itself, make the section applicable.
Section 2036 can only apply where, in addition, the donor spouse is
viewed as having made a transfer to the trust. 78 As suggested, absent the
step transaction doctrine, the donor spouse is not so viewed.
3.

Creditors'Rightsand Section 2041

To be sure, inclusion in the donor spouse's estate could nonetheless
occur under section 2041 based on a creditor theory without regard to the
transfer issue. In other words, if as a matter of state law the donor spouse
is treated as having funded the trust and her creditors could therefore
reach the trust's assets, the spouse's estate would include the assets under
section 204 179 even though she is not deemed the transferor for tax
purposes.80 But this is a difficulty that can probably be avoided in most
states through proper drafting. As long as the trust instrument provides
that distributions to the donor spouse are subject to an ascertainable

77 However, a state court might be receptive to the argument that the donee
spouse's

general power of appointment sufficiently breaks the chain so that the donee spouse
should be viewed more properly as the person funding the trust. Such reasoning would be
parallel to the Service's decision not to apply the step transaction doctrine in the private
letter rulings; choosing to respect the form of the transaction, the state courts, like the
Service, might view the donee spouse as making the transfer and funding the trust when
the taxpayer exercises the general power of appointment or allows it to lapse.
79See Rev. Rul. 77-378, 1977-2 C.B. 347; Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293.
Nor
would section 2033 apply. For where the decedent's right to access assets lapses at death,
the section does not apply. See Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. of Baltimore, 316
U.S. 56 (1942) (refusing to apply the predecessor of section 2033 in these circumstances).
79 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c) (indicating that if one can exercise a power to
discharge a legal obligation of the power holder, the power is a general power of
appointment within the scope of section 2041).
80 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(b)(2) (providing that section 2041 will not apply
if
the power is "within the concept of sections 2036 through 2038"). But if, as is assumed in
the text, the donor spouse is not viewed as the transferor for estate tax purposes, the power
could not fall within the scope of sections 2036 or 2038 and could, therefore, constitute a
general power falling within the scope of section 2041. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8916032 (Apr.
21, 1989).
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standard relating to health, education, maintenance, or support, section
2041 should not be applicable.8
Thus, while as a practical matter section 2041 should not be an
impediment to the GPOA strategy, if the Service successfully invoked the
step transaction doctrine, section 2036 would remain a threat on either of
two theories: the donor spouse had an implied understanding concerning
distributions, or the donor spouse's creditors had the right to reach trust
assets under state law.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE

GPOA STRATEGY

A. The Lifetime QTIP Trust
In terms of planning, the question becomes how to negate the section
2036, and possibly the section 2038, risk. If the donor spouse elected to
create a QTIP trust, neither section 2036 nor section 2038 could be
invoked at the death of the donor spouse8 ' because the donee spouse is
treated as the transferor for estate and gift tax purposes.8 3 As a result,
sections 2036 and 2038-both of which can only apply if the decedent
had made a transfer-become unavailable to the Service in the donor

81

Where such a standard limits a power, section 2041 does not apply. See I.R.C.

§ 2041(b)(l)(A). Thus, if, as a matter of state law, creditors cannot reach more than the
trustee could distribute under a maximum exercise of discretion under the standard
contained in the instrument, see supra note 76, and if the instrument contains such an
ascertainable standard, creditor access would thereby be limited and inclusion in the donor
spouse's estate under section 2041 would be precluded. Cf Tech. Adv. Mem. 199917001
(Jan. 15, 1999) (acknowledging that such a standard could limit creditor access under state
law and would therefore limit the Service's ability to include the trust in the grantor's
estate under section 2036 of the Code). Before using this drafting approach, however, a
person should confirm that the state law in question follows the Restatement or that it
generally does not permit the settlor's creditors to reach trust assets. For as indicated in
note 76 supra, some courts appear to allow creditors access without regard to the standard
contained in the instrument. See, e.g., State v. Coyle, 575 N.Y.S.2d 975 (App. Div. 1991)
(permitting the state, a medical provider, full access even though the instrument permitted
an invasion only for "luxuries[ ] not provided by public welfare funds or medical
insurance"). Nonetheless, a distribution power subject to a standard relating to health,
education, maintenance, or support should not trigger section 2041, unless as a matter of
state law the existence of the standard is deemed entirely irrelevant in determining the
creditor-access issue. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 82-63, 1982-1 C.B. 135 (indicating that whether
a standard is ascertainable is a matter of state law).
82 The donee spouse's gross estate would include the trust assets. See I.R.C.
§ 2044.
The inclusion is a desirable outcome because it prevents the donee spouse's exemption
from being wasted.
83 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(f)-l(f), ex. 11.
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spouse's estate. 4 Thus, if the donor spouse makes the election, these
sections, as well as the step transaction doctrine, become irrelevant. Also,
as suggested, section 2041 should not apply as long as distributions are
subject to an appropriate ascertainable standard."
Thus, if the donor spouse creates a QTIP trust shortly before the death
of the donee spouse, the donee spouse's exemption is not wasted, and the
trust functions as a credit shelter trust after the donee spouse's death. The
donor spouse's estate will not include the trust's assets if distributions are
subject to an appropriate, ascertainable standard.86 But if the donor spouse
is unwilling to do this because of possible loss of control, could she
accomplish her objectives by borrowing a page from the GPOA strategy?
In other words, could the donor spouse create the QTIP trust while
maintaining control by retaining, as in the GPOA strategy, the right to
revoke the trust until the death of the donee spouse? This raises the
question whether the donor spouse could make a QTIP election on a gift
tax return filed after the death of the donee spouse where the donee's
income interest was subject to the donor's revocation power until the
moment of the donee's death. The Service, in a private letter ruling, has
addressed this question and concluded that the election could be made in
these circumstances.8 7
The QTIP strategy is attractive paradoxically from both the taxpayer's
and the Service's perspective. In terms of taxpayers, if properly drafted,
the QTIP strategy has no downside risk. As long as the donor spouse
retains a special power of appointment once the donee spouse has died,88
the donor cannot be treated as having made a taxable gift on the death of
the donee spouse. In other words, even assuming the Service were to

84
85
86

See id.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
As indicated, the lifetime QTIP trust could be made irrevocable when the first

spouse dies, just as the general power of appointment discussed in the private letter rulings
also becomes irrevocable at that time. As discussed in the text, there seem to be grounds
for the conclusion that the Service should allow the marital deduction even though
irrevocability occurs at that time. Nevertheless, to eliminate any risk on this issue, it
seems appropriate for the spouse who will be creating the lifetime QTIP trust to make it
irrevocable at least a short time before his or her spouse dies.
87 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200413011 (Dec. 3, 2003).
88 For a discussion of the donor's ability to retain such a power in the case of a QTIP
trust, see J. Blattmachr, M. Gans & D. Zeydel, The World's Greatest Gift Tax Mystery,
Solved, 115 TAx NOTES 243 (2007). See also Mitchell M. Gans, Jonathan G. Blattmachr
& Diana S.C. Zeydel, SuperchargedCredit Shelter Trust, 21 PROB. & PROP., July/Aug.
2007, at 52.
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change its view and conclude that the QTIP election is inapplicable
because the gift of the income interest to the donee did not occur until
after the donee's death, the donor spouse should not be treated as having
made a taxable gift to the trust's remainder beneficiaries.89 While the
same power-of-appointment approach could be utilized in conjunction
with the GPOA strategy to avoid this downside risk,9 ° the QTIP strategy
offers a powerful upside advantage: if the Service recognizes the QTIP
election as valid, it cannot later invoke section 2036 or 2038 in the donor
spouse's estate. 9' In contrast, a taxpayer who utilizes the GPOA strategy
without securing a private letter ruling must run the risk that, at the donor
spouse's death, the Service will argue that under the step transaction
doctrine one of these sections applies.92 Finally, unlike the GPOA
strategy, the QTIP strategy does not create any terminable interest risk.93
Nonetheless, until the Service or Congress acts, taxpayers who want to
make certain that a waste of the exemption does not occur should make
sure that the donor spouse's revocation power is extinguished before the
donee spouse's death.
From the Service's perspective, the QTIP strategy is also attractive.
While enabling taxpayers to avoid the portability problem, the QTIP
89 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c).

See Gans & Blattmachr, supra note 2, at 10. However, it has been suggested that
the donor's special power of appointment might not be effective in rendering any possible
90

gift incomplete on the donee's death. See Mulligan, supra note 2, at 191. This suggestion
does not seem plausible. If the Service were to maintain that the donor makes a taxable
gift at the time of the donee's death, it would do so on the ground that the donee had
already died at the time of the gift (for example, a terminable interest argument could not
be made in the QTIP context); otherwise, the gift would qualify for the marital deduction.
If the view is that the donee died at the time of the gift, the donor spouse would
necessarily be viewed as the one making the transfer to the trust-with the donor's special
power rendering any such gift incomplete. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c).
91 See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
92 If the QTIP strategy applies, an additional strategy exists: after the donee spouse's
death, the trust will be treated as the donor spouse's grantor trust. For a discussion of this
drafting approach and the advantages it offers, see supra, note 88. Note, however, in the
case of the GPOA strategy, as long as the donee spouse allows the general power to lapse,
the trust will be treated as the donor spouse's grantor trust. See Treas. Reg. § 1.671-2.
93 If the Service accepts the QTIP election, the QTIP exception to the terminable
interest rule will preclude the Service from invoking the rule. See I.R.C. § 2523(f)(l)(B).
Thus, should the Service agree that the gift occurs the moment before the donee spouse's
death, it must permit the marital deduction. In the case of the GPOA strategy, in contrast,
even assuming the Service agrees with the taxpayer as to the timing of the gift, it may
nevertheless argue that the deduction is unavailable on the basis of the terminable interest
rule. See supra.
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strategy does not create the unintended consequences inherent in the
GPOA strategy: it does not undermine the step transaction doctrine and
therefore does not weaken section 2036 or 2038. Thus, if the Service
wants to find an administrative solution to the portability problem, it
should adopt a revenue ruling that embraces the QTIP strategy. The ruling
should make clear that the taxpayer can make the QTIP election after the
death of the donee spouse and that, as a result, neither section 2036 nor
section 2038 can apply at the donor spouse's later death. 94
B. An Alternative to the Lifetime QTIP Trust
Another strategy without downside risk that planners may consider
involves structuring the documents to permit a possible disclaimer by the
donee spouse's executor. Under this strategy, the donee spouse receives a
general testamentary power under the donor spouse's revocable trust. In
the donee's estate planning documents, the power is not exercised. 95 As a
result of the donee's death, the property subject to the power passes by
operation of the lapse of the donee's power to a trust designed to function
as a credit shelter trust for the benefit of the donor spouse. The donor
spouse's revocable trust provides that if the donee or the donee's executor
disclaims the power, the property in the trust reverts to the donor.
After the donee's death, the donee's executor either disclaims, which
would cause the property to return to the donor, or instead allows the
property to lapse into the credit shelter trust. Before making this
decision-before deciding whether to implement the strategy or instead
terminate it by disclaimer-the executor could seek a private letter ruling.
If the Service were to rule favorably, the strategy would be implemented.
However, if the Service refused to rule or could not rule within the nine
month disclaimer period,96 the executor's disclaimer could terminate the

94 As an alternative, the Service could adopt a regulation that mirrors the QTIP
regulation in the context of a general-power-of-appointment trust. See Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2523(f)-l(f). Such a regulation would provide that once the donee's spouse's estate
includes the corpus of a lifetime marital trust under section 2041, neither section 2036 nor
2038 could apply at the donor spouse's later death. Such a regulation would enable the
Service to embrace fully the GPOA strategy without the concern of inadvertently
weakening these sections. However, whereas the QTIP regulation has authority in the
Code (section 2044(c)), a general-power-of-appointment trust does not.
The donee exercising the power might mean an acceptance that would preclude
the donee's executor from disclaiming after the donee's death. See Tech. Adv. Mem.
8142008 (Dec. 31, 1980).
96 See I.R.C. § 2518.
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strategy. 97 Most importantly, if the executor terminates the strategy by
disclaimer, the property would pass back to the donor spouse without any
gift tax being imposed on the donor and without any other adverse tax
consequence other than the failure to achieve the upside objective of
preserving the donee's exemption. In short, like the QTIP strategy, this
strategy offers upside potential for resolving a couple's portability
problem without creating any downside risk.
VI. CONCLUSION
Effective use of the unified credit (the estate tax exemption) for the
first spouse of a married couple to die is an important feature in good
estate tax planning. Such use generally occurs by having the spouse create
a credit shelter trust from which the surviving spouse will benefit without
causing the trust's assets to be included in the gross estate of the surviving
spouse. For several reasons, the exemption may be wasted. For example,
one spouse dies without sufficient assets to use the full exemption.
Another cause of the wasting of the exemption may be that the character
of the assets held by the first spouse to die are not as efficient as other
assets in funding the exemption. Although Congress has considered
allowing the surviving spouse to use any unused exemption, no such
legislation has been enacted. The Service, however, in a series of private
letter rulings, has approved a strategy that, if valid, would permit couples
to avoid the portability problem. Under the strategy, the donor spouse
creates a revocable trust, giving the donee spouse a testamentary general
power of appointment over the trust's assets.
Among other conclusions, these rulings state that the donor spouse's
gift to the donee spouse occurs while they are still married and that the
gift therefore qualifies for the gift tax marital deduction. The Service also
concludes that the donee spouse's estate includes the assets subject to the
power and the assets are therefore available for use against his or her
exemption. Most importantly, the Service concludes that the donor
spouse's gross estate does not include the trust created with the generalpower-of-appointment property, even if the donor has the right to the
income from the trust, holds a special power of appointment over the
trust, or both.
Although commendable, the reasoning of the private letter rulings
appears to be fundamentally flawed. The rulings do not take into account
See Rolin v. Comm'r, 588 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1978) (permitting a disclaimer in
similar circumstances).
97
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the step transaction doctrine, under which the donor spouse almost
certainly should be viewed as the transferor of the property in the trust,
subjecting the property to inclusion in the donor spouse's gross estate at
his or her later death and thereby causing the strategy to fail.
Given this flaw, the use of a lifetime QTIP trust in the donor spouse's
revocable trust is an attractive alternative. Because the Service can
approve this strategy without causing adverse consequences in unrelated
contexts, it should do so to provide taxpayers with a portability solution.
In the meantime, in order to minimize risk of failure, planners should
consider using the QTIP strategy instead of the general power strategy
approved in the rulings.

